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Political Terrorism: An Historical 
Case Study of the Italian Red 
Brigades
By Major Victor H. Sundquist, U.S. Army
"Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it."
— George Santayana
Introduction
As the world's governments become increasingly engulfed in economic 
and political strife, international leaders should step back and understand 
what historical realities enabled political extremism to surface in particu-
lar regions of the world. More important, these leaders need to recognize 
what past governments did to counter these movements. Global commu-
nities are currently witnessing a dynamic trend of populous uprisings that 
in some cases, like Greece and the United States, have the potential to 
severely disrupt the activities of local governments. Consequently, it 
behooves leaders to reflect upon historical precedence in order to avoid 
repeating the same mistakes of our forefathers. Accordingly, the rise and 
fall of the Italian Red Brigades represents a classic case study from which 
to understand the dynamics behind the development of a political terror-
ist organization and its effects on society as a whole.
The Rise of Class Warfare in Italy
Throughout history governments have experienced the ebb and flow of 
social movements within their borders ranging from mundane episodes of 
civilian "sit-ins" to more extreme encounters of terrorist militant attacks. 
During the mid 1900s, the spread of Marxist Communism represented 
one of several forms of social collectivism that rooted itself within the fab-
ric of European societies. Between 1960 and 1980, governments across 
Europe witnessed and in some cases participated in several of these types 
of political events. In Italy, for instance, worker and student movements 
rose to prominence as center-left coalition government leaders "fail[ed] to 
bring promised reforms to Italian society" that subsequently led to the 
"mass worker strikes of 1968–1970."1 Furthermore, outdated and deterio-
rating university systems emboldened and in some instances radicalized 
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student behaviors against union and government officials creating the 
necessary framework for future extremism. Inevitably, this caustic envi-
ronment infused with the spread of a 1920s style Marxist-Leninist ideol-
ogy led to one of Italy's most prolifically violent periods as student activist 
groups formed within Italy's workers' movement and subsequently advo-
cated violence as a means to pursue class warfare.
The development of these radical organizations predominately centered 
around the perception that Communist organizations, like the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI) as well as factory trade union officials had lost 
sight of the original ideals set forth in the initial Communist movement. 
Some of these ideals involved the expanded commitment to Italian youth 
to broaden the availability of university level education and also the gov-
ernment's pledge to provide better working class conditions within the 
country's factories. Consequently, as these areas of government commit-
ment to the people began to wane, so too did the people's commitment to 
the Italian Government to preserve social order within the current politi-
cal framework. For instance, Italian student activists viewed cooperation 
between Communist party leaders and Christian Democratic officials as a 
political statement of non-support to the working class society as many of 
the instituted policies were perceived as detrimental to the protection of 
the factory workers.
To further complicate matters, the prior de-Stalinization of the Soviet 
Union had helped ease Cold War tensions between Western influences 
and European Communists. This phenomenon provided Italian business 
owners the opportunity to mesh communist business strategies with that 
of capitalist models. Western business philosophies, however, were seen 
by some as one of the root causes of increased disparities between trade 
workers and union leaders as company owners utilized advancing tech-
nologies in their factories at the expense of the work force. The rising ten-
sions between factory workers and trade union leaders, mixed with the 
growing discontent of frustrated and alienated university students, even-
tually led to the formation of several ultra-left radical groups. One of these 
groups, the Red Brigade, would leave its mark in history as one of Italy's 
most dominant and violent extremist organizations the country had seen 
since World War II, and would prove as difficult to eventually track down 
and dismantle.
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Formation and Ideologies (1969–1972)
The Red Brigade, more commonly referred to in Italian as the Brigate 
Rosse (BR), was officially formed on October 20, 1970 by University of 
Trento activist student Renato Curcio along with his girlfriend Mara 
Cagol and his activist friend Alberto Franceschini.2 This ultra-leftist 
group emerged from the rank and file of the 1960s worker and student 
protest movements where they claimed support for the local trade unions 
in their fight against the right-wing political bourgeoisie. The Red Brigade 
initially directed their efforts in the larger Italian cities of Milan and Turin 
where they viewed themselves as offshoots of the Autonomia Operaia 
(AO) extra-parliamentary movement. Acting as a faction of this larger, 
fragmented political movement, group leaders tended to "operate mainly 
in the factories, where social disparities were more evident and labor dis-
putes more acute."3 Group leaders, however, advocated for the creation of 
a revolutionary state through the use of armed struggle in order to create 
a split between the Italian Government and other Western Alliances.4 
Because of the group's disdain toward the union leadership's treatment of 
local factory workers, as well as the government's capitulation in solving 
important social issues, many of the early ideological goals of the leader-
ship involved targeted attacks on "the establishment" such as unionists, 
politicians, and businessmen.
In late 1971, Red Brigade group motivations forced a shift in its internal 
terrorist tactics from a tactical viewpoint to more of a strategic approach 
as members evolved from the participation in the local destruction of 
union leader's vehicles and factory equipment to broader attacks against 
union headquarters and business offices. Inevitably, this tactical shift 
would also push the group's extremist operations into the world of human 
targeting as brigade members claimed responsibility for the organiza-
tion's first kidnapping in March 1972 of factory foreman Sit Siemens.5 
Slowly the Red Brigade developed a reputation throughout Italy as one of 
the most solid and consistent leftist ideological extremist groups in 
Europe. As stated by Donatella della Porta in Terrorism in Context, the 
Red Brigade's Marxist-Leninist ideology became more prevalent as group 
documents surfaced indicating that, "the working class [was] the revolu-
tionary subject, the capitalist system [was] the enemy, the state [was] the 
guard dog of the bourgeoisie, and [the] Christian Democracy [was] its 
party."6 The Red Brigade, in essence, was attempting to broaden its mili-
tary and political platform along a more national framework by attempt-
ing to legitimize its political and physical retribution tactics against the 
right wing.
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Group Structure Development (1973–1974)
Red Brigade leaders consistently viewed themselves and their ideologies 
as the standard-bearers of the Marxist-Leninist Communist movement. 
The group saw their actions as an "armed avant-garde (forward guard) 
working within the proletariat in order to establish a [political] party."7 
Consequently, brigade leaders in 1974 developed the Strategic Directorate 
(DS) that was responsible for establishing the Red Brigade's organiza-
tional structure consisting of an Executive Committee, urban and regional 
divisions (colonne), and brigade fronts (fronti). The initial structure of the 
BR was similar to the organizational layout of an Army unit. For instance, 
the Strategic Directorate acted much like a military command element in 
that it established protocols and guidelines for the entire organization to 
follow. The Executive Committee, in turn, functioned as a headquarters 
staff element by publishing the command guidelines and ensuring that 
the day-to-day operations of the organization ran smoothly.
The Red Brigade "field unit" structure consisted of urban and regional 
divisions that were designed to break down command and control of the 
organization along specific boundary lines. Within each of the regions or 
urban commands (divisions), the BR further established "front" elements 
that were responsible for defined duties like logistics, propaganda, and 
recruitment activities. Each of these "front" elements and command divi-
sions reported up a vertical chain of command to the Executive Commit-
tee and eventually to the Strategic Directorate (DS). This 
compartmentalized structure essentially enabled all decision making pro-
cesses to originate at the DS level while maintaining a secretive wall 
between division and urban command operations. Eventually this rigidly 
clandestine command structure would require a more formal means to 
communicate the leadership's overarching and changing objectives as the 
previous use of loose networks within the factory communities had out-
grown its effectiveness.
Group Doctrine Development (1974–1975)
Brigade leaders subsequently published their first doctrine "manifesto" in 
1975 with the development of the Resolution of Strategic Directorate 
(RDS) that helped define the organization's goals and objectives. Strictly 
speaking, the RDS defined the group's goal as a "concentrated strike 
against the heart of the State because the [S]tate is an imperialist collec-
tion of multinational corporations."8 This manifesto in essence gave justi-
fication and clear guidance for some of the group's earlier political targets 
within the Italian Democratic Christian Party to include the 1974 murders 
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of two Italian Social Movement activists. More important, this document 
helped solidify the group's reasoning for targeting local police and legal 
authorities in an effort to enhance their terror operations in the urban 
areas.
The new RDS doctrine also represented a major shift in the group's origi-
nal ideology of supporting local political activities of the broader worker's 
movement. The group manifesto essentially realigned the Red Brigade 
organization into a more nationalistic militant movement aligned against 
regional authorities as well as the Italian State. Unfortunately, this 
aggressive militant approach bore more resemblance to an anarchist style 
organization than an emerging political movement. The group's ensuing 
attacks and brutal tactics eventually chipped away at their support base as 
many sympathizers felt increasingly isolated from the group's new ideo-
logical beliefs.
The Red Brigade's doctrinal shift along with the group's past terrorist 
activities inevitably forced Italian officials to redirect their counterterror-
ism efforts against the organization's leadership and its operational net-
works. As a result of the increased Italian security pressure on the group, 
by late 1976 many of the original members, including Renalto Curcio and 
Alberto Franceschini, were in police custody. Many speculated, including 
Curcio and Franceschini, that their arrests were the result of alleged inter-
nal group turncoats, Mario Moretti and Giovanni Senzani, who they 
believed worked for the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
and Italian Security Services.9 Furthermore, Mara Cagol, Renalto Curcio's 
wife and one of the original founders, was subsequently killed by police 
during a struggle shortly after her arrest. These arrests along with Italian 
authority's systematic counterterrorism response to the Red Brigade 
effectively enabled the government to initially quiet the militant activities 
of the original leaders. The Italian Government's inability to completely 
dismantle the Red Brigade's mid-level leadership, however, led to the 
eventual consolidation and development of the remaining BR members 
into a more violent, well disciplined, and radicalized organization that 
would soon propel itself into the Italian national spotlight.
Group Transition Period (1976–1984)
By 1976, terrorist activity in Italy had, "expanded so rapidly that it over-
shadowed all other West European countries."10 In some social corners 
this expansion of violence was primarily viewed as the result of the United 
State's indirect involvement in anti-Communist destabilizing operations. 
Furthermore, the "shadow wars" being fought in the Italian cities between 
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Cold War powers were beginning to lead many locals to believe spurious 
rumors that the current government was close to collapse.11 Fortunately 
for the Red Brigade, the ideological battle between social policies enabled 
the group to expand its recruitment activities away from the working mid-
dle class areas to the intellectual corridors of the regional universities. 
This fresh intellectual influence into the ranks would eventually lead the 
Red Brigade's Strategic Directorate under the leadership of Mario Moretti 
to declare in the spring of 1977 that its working class advanced guard 
(avant-garde) was effectively in place and that "the time had come to set 
up the Communist Combatant Party (PCC)" in order to guide the working 
class to the next political level.12 Internal group strife during this organi-
zational realignment, however, had forced the Red Brigade to splinter 
into two factions, the First Position (Prima Posizione) and the Second 
Position (Seconda Posizione).13 One faction, the First Position was seen 
as the more violent of the two offshoots and focused a bulk of its efforts on 
engaging the government security apparatus.14 The Second Position was a 
more moderate faction and would eventually wither away leaving the 
extremist viewpoint as the dominant force within the new organization. 
Eventually this transition within the Red Brigade, coupled with the 
group's increase in new intellectual recruits, laid the foundation for an 
organizational evolution that fostered a violent escalation of armed politi-
cal activity that culminated in the 1978 kidnapping and assassination of 
Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro.
The Beginning of the End (The Aldo Moro Episode)
At the time of Aldo Moro's kidnapping, the Red Brigade was not viewed as 
a national threat to the Italian Government; rather, they were viewed as 
just another leftist terror organization claiming to represent working class 
citizens. In fact, past counterterrorism activities had targeted the original 
brigade leadership, and had effectively killed or captured all founding 
members. Unfortunately, the reorganization that followed rendered a 
smaller yet more potent radical group that was not afraid to escalate vio-
lence to the next level. The result of this new violent approach was quickly 
seen on March 16, 1978 when Red Brigade members abducted Prime Min-
ster Aldo Moro after ambushing his car, killing his chauffer and five 
policemen.15 This attack ironically occurred as Moro made his way to 
work in order to submit a plan that would have stabilized Italian politics 
by including the Communists in the government for the first time in the 
nation's history. The kidnapping did not represent the first time brigade 
members had targeted a person, yet it represented the first instance that a 
high level government official had been abducted by a leftist terror orga-
nization in Italy. This incident also gave the Red Brigade a national stage 
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from which the organization spent the next 55 days trying to convince the 
Christian Democrats to accept the group's terms for exchanging Mr. Moro 
for ransom and the release of 16 brigade members.
To the dismay of the Red Brigade kidnappers, neither Italian Government 
officials nor Christian Democratic leaders would accept the group's terms 
or open direct dialogue with any of the brigade members. The historical 
thought behind the refusal to negotiate is possibly rooted in the theory 
that Aldo Moro was privy to information that would expose Operation 
Gladio, which was a CIA plot, in connection with Italian police, to collapse 
the Communist movement using secret "stay behind" agents.16 This the-
ory was further fueled by a later BBC interview with Italian Interior Min-
ister Francesco Cossiga who stated, "Aldo Moro's death still weighs 
heavily on the Christian Democrats as does the decision I came to, which 
turned my hair white, to practically sacrifice Moro to save the Republic." 
The waiting game unfortunately ended when Red Brigade leader, Mario 
Moretti, allegedly shot the Prime Minister 11 times killing him in the back 
seat of a car.17
The assassination stunned the Italian population who adored Aldo Moro, 
and ultimately led to the downfall of the group as popular support for the 
leftist cause began to wane. Immediately following the death of the Prime 
Minister, Italian authorities and politicians alike took stock of the horrific 
situation and decided to wage an all-out war against the leftist network. 
The Italian Government viewed the Red Brigade attacks as a serious 
threat to the current regime and swore to take whatever actions were nec-
essary in order to stabilize the situation. Imprisoned Red Brigade 
founders Curcio and Franceschini also accused Moretti of "bureaucratic 
and militaristic aberrations" that did nothing to advance the cause of the 
proletariat.18 Inevitably, pressure from Italian security forces who waged 
an effective information and military campaign against the terrorist orga-
nization mixed with the demise of popular support for the leftist move-
ment led to the defeat of the Red Brigade group. This violent chapter in 
Italian history would eventually come to an end during the early 1980s; 
however, the Red Brigade would test its militant capabilities one last time 
before the group would fade away.
The Dozier Kidnapping
On December 17, 1981, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Dep-
uty Chief of Staff General James Dozier was abducted from his Verona 
apartment by four Red Brigade members posing as plumbers. The kid-
napping of General Dozier represented both a tactical and a strategic shift 
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for the Red Brigade as it depicted the first time the group had targeted a 
foreign national.19 Subsequent demands by the group included a condem-
nation of U.S. military forces along with NATO, and further promoted the 
ideology of all European revolutionary forces joining in a fight on an 
international scale. Brigade members quickly put General Dozier on trial 
and released a 188-page document that outlined the group's strategic 
goals. Fortunately, Italian police were able to locate and rescue General 
Dozier 42 days after his capture. For Red Brigade members, this episode 
represented the last successful major attack of their organization. The 
kidnapping of an American General Officer consequently brought swift 
action against the organization from both Italian and NATO security 
forces. Eventually, Red Brigade members were either killed, arrested, or 
chose to quietly dissolve back into society to attempt to reorganize the 
group. The ideologies of the original Red Brigade, however, did not disap-
pear as witnessed by the emergence of an offshoot organization in 1984 
conveniently named the New Red Brigade.
The New Red Brigade (1984)
The New Red Brigade, also known as the Communist Combatant Party 
(BR/PCC), surfaced in 1984 following the demise of the original organiza-
tion. The BR/PCC was also a Marxist-Leninist group that promoted the 
ideology of, "continuing [the] struggle between capitalist imperialism and 
the oppressed proletariat."20 The group's ultimate goals included, "the 
destruction of democracy and the creation of a new society through armed 
militant action."21 The New Red Brigade also extended its opposition to 
include Italy's foreign policies involving NATO. Some of this opposition 
centered in the idea that Italy's Government was merely a puppet state for 
external western powers. The group subsequently considered the Italian 
Government its ideological enemy. Consequently, many of the BR/PCC's 
targets included high ranking Italian political and business leaders, as 
well as foreign policy officials. Past comments by group leaders in 2002 
commending the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks brought added 
attention to the organization from United States intelligence agencies. 
Still, the U.S. State Department did not officially designate the New Red 
Brigade as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The State Department 
instead listed the group on the 2002 and 2003 terrorist watch lists, and 
currently lists the BR/PCC on its "Other Terrorist Group" list.22
Unlike the Red Brigades, the BR/PCC did not become involved in kidnap-
pings as a means to spread its ideology or to create anxiety in the public 
domain. The new organization, however, did continue to implement the 
tactical use of assassinations and terrorist bombings to create chaos in the 
Sundquist: Political Terrorism: An Historical Case Study of the Italian Red
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
Journal of Strategic Security
62
local Italian communities in order to demonstrate a lack of security by the 
government. The first known instance of attacks by the BR/PCC took 
place in May of 1999 when group members assassinated Italy's Labor 
Ministry Advisor Massimo D'Antona.23 Additionally, in April 2001, the 
BR/PCC bombed the Institute for International Affairs in Rome, an attack 
that, fortunately, did not kill anyone. The following year in March, group 
members targeted and killed Labor Ministry Advisor Marco Biagi.24 
Although BR/PCC activity had started to increase in earlier years, 2003 
would prove to be the culmination point for the New Red Brigade and 
Italian authorities. For instance, in March an Italian security guard was 
killed along with BR/PCC leader, Mario Galesi, during a shootout on a 
Florence-bound passenger train. The incident also led to the arrest of 
another BR/PCC leader, Desdemona Lioce, "who had been fleeing Italian 
authorities since 1995 and had been implicated in the assassination of 
Massimo D'Antona in 1999."25 Interestingly, the subsequent raid on 
Massimo's apartment by Italian police produced weapons ranging from 
pistols and hand grenades to high-level explosives that were thought to 
have originated from earlier ties with the Palestinian Liberation Organi-
zation (PLO).
The Final Italian Response (2003)
The rise in extremist activity quickly heightened the concerns of the Ital-
ian public who remembered the days when the original Red Brigade orga-
nization created havoc throughout the country. The Italian authorities 
consequently decided to intensify and expand their counterterrorism 
operations against the BR/PCC and its networks. These increased opera-
tions included a robust media campaign coupled with increased funding 
for source payments. The new Italian counterterrorism approach not only 
enabled the authorities to create an effective barrier between the extrem-
ist group and the public, but also allowed police to infiltrate and break-
down the BR/PCC network relatively quickly. In fact, a 2003 United 
States Congressional Issue Brief indicated that the Italian rewards for 
information program was, "instrumental in Italy destroying the Red Bri-
gades."26 The tactic essentially enabled police to identify BR/PCC mem-
bers, map the networks, and aggressively prevent future attacks by 
arresting all known members of the terrorist group. Italian counterterror-
ism efforts ultimately paid off with the October 2003 arrests of six BR/
PCC members connected to the March 2003 passenger train attacks. Two 
more group members who were subsequently arrested in Cairo, Egypt in 
January 2004, were believed to be linked to the notorious 1978 Aldo Moro 
kidnapping and murder.
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The Italian Government demonstrated the capability and resolve to deal a 
severe blow to the BR/PCC organization. The authorities effectively dis-
mantled the group, and forced a decrease in membership within the BR/
PCC rank and file to a reported 20 members.27 Over time the remaining 
Red Brigade followers would try to combine their efforts with other nota-
ble leftist groups like the Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA) in 
order to consolidate efforts for future attacks. Ideological divisions within 
the ranks, however, would ultimately lead to a significantly weakened 
organization that, to this day, shows little ability to promote the original 
Leninist-Marxist movement.
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Conclusion
The rise and fall of the Red Brigade along with the Italian response to the 
terrorist organization is clearly a case study that all counterterrorism 
analysis should study and understand because it depicts a successful gov-
ernment response to a militant political ideology. The Red Brigade effec-
tively became known as one of the only left-wing extremist organizations 
that nearly caused the collapse of a modern day government. As a group 
of highly motivated and disciplined student and worker activists, the Red 
Brigades were able to effectively harness the post World War II emotions 
surrounding perceived government intrusions into worker's rights, and 
inter-relate their brand of Marxist ideologies with class warfare tactics in 
order to rally popular support behind their cause.
As with any political movement, popular support is required in order for 
the movement to exist and inevitably expand. The terrorist activities of 
the Red Brigade were no different. From robberies to bombings, and 
assassinations to kidnappings, the Red Brigade gradually ascended to the 
top of the terrorist food chain by articulating a message of support to the 
broader public while attacking the Government. The group's actions 
would ultimately lead to their inevitable demise as their eventual targets 
included beloved members of the Italian political elite and ranking offic-
ers of a Western superpower. In the end, the strategic failure of the Red 
Brigade was the result of a virtual split between the organization and the 
public created by Italian police who incorporated informational opera-
tions with a new counterterrorism tactic of "money for information." Con-
sequently, the political will of the people eventually outlasted the 
ideological desire of the Red Brigade leaders causing the public to ulti-
mately see the group for what it represented: terrorism.
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